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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California law, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarIzes recent 
California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions of special importance to women. A brief 
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised 
in each case is provided. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Sex Offenses 
1. Refusal to grant probation to sex offender 
because of lack of locally available reha-
bilitation program upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 577 
2. Defense of reasonable mistake not availa-
ble to defendant charged with lewd or las-
civious conduct with a child under the age 
of fourteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 580 
3. Evidence that a victim is suffering from 
rape trauma syndrome is not admissible 
to prove that a rape has occurred. . . . . .. 584 
B. Felony Child Abuse 
1. Felony child abuse may not serve as the 
underlying felony to support a conviction 
of second degree murder under the felony 
murder theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 588 
C. Child Stealing 
1. Parent not guilty of child stealing where 
reconciliation cancels an interlocutory 
custody decree......................... 591 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. Community Property 
575 
1
Black and Hardy: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
576 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:575 
1. Wife entitled to that portion of the hus-
band's disability which represents her 
share of community property interest in 
his retirement benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 594 
2. Separate property of a spouse which is 
converted to joint tenancy during the 
marriage or is used to acquire joint ten-
ancy property during marriage lS pre-
sumed to be community property . . . . . .. 596 
3. A debt owed to a spouse as part of a prop-
erty settlement agreement can be dis-
charged in bankruptcy if it arises out of a 
division of community property unrelated 
to alimony, support, or maintenance 600 
B. Decedent's Estates 
1. Putative spouse entitled to succeed to 
share of decedent's separate property 604 
C. Child Custody and Control 
1. Trial court must find that award of cus-
tody of a child to its natural father would 
be detrimental to the child before it may 
terminate natural father's custody rights. 607 
2. Discontinuation of visitation is in best in-
terest of child where child has been sexu-
ally molested by lather. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 614 
3. Application of the term "convicted," as 
found in the Civil Code, is limited to in-
stances where there has been a final judg-
ment ................................. 618 
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A. Employment Discrimination 
1. Gender is not a bona fide occupational 
qualification for a position as a cook in a 
, . 'l men s }al ............................ . 
B. Unemployment Insurance 
620 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/4
1985] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 577 
1. Employee who accompanies "non-marital 
partner" voluntarily leaves work with 
good cause within the meaning of the stat-
ute governing. eligibility for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits ............... , 623 
C. Wrongful Discharge 
1. Woman wrongfully discharged for dating 
employee of her employer's competitor 625 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Equal Protection 
1. A difference in rights accorded to mothers 
and nonpresumed fathers does not violate 
the equal protection clause of the Califor-
nia or U.S. Constitutions . ............. , 628 
I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Sex Offenses 
1. Refusal to grant probation to sex offender because 
of lack of locally available rehabilitation program 
upheld. 
People v. Lucero, 154 Cal. App. 3d 245, 201 Cal. Rptr. 99 
(5th Dist. 1984). The court of appeal in People v. Lucero af-
firmed a trial court's denial of probation to a defendant who had 
been found guilty of incest and lewd and lascivious acts with his 
daughter while she was under the age of fourteen. l The court 
held that the trial court's finding did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
The father had been regularly sexually molesting his daugh-
ter since she was four years old. The daughter did not tell any-
one about the incidents until she was sixteen years old. She tes-
tified that she had remained silent because her father had told 
her that he would kill himself if she told anyone. 
The father pleaded guilty to incest2 and lewd and lascivious 
acts on a child under the age of fourteen. 3 Conflicting psycholog-
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 285 and 288 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
3
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ical evaluations of the father were given at the hearing. He re-
quested probation. 
The court of appeal denied the father's request for proba-
tion under Penal Code section 1203.066.4 This section provides 
that probation will be denied to sex offenders who have engaged 
in "substantial sexual conduct" with a victim under the age of 
eleven years or who "occup[y] a position of special trust" in rela-
tion to the victim. II The section defines "position of special 
trust" as "occupied by a person in a position of authority who by 
reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over 
the victim. Position of authority includes, but is not limited to, 
the position occupied by a natural parent . . . ."6 
The defendant first contended that the information did not 
properly charge him so as to bring him within the probation re-
strictions of section 1203.066. The court determined that the 
"substantial sexual conduct" provision was satisfied because the 
defendant had engaged in fondling, oral copulation and, eventu-
ally, sexual intercourse with his daughter before she had reached 
majority. The court next rejected the father's argument that sec-
tion 1203.066 required that the prosecution show that he was, in 
fact, trusted by the victim. The court characterized this reading 
of the section as "hypertechnical" and held that the only finding 
needed to satisfy this provision was that the father was the nat-
ural father of the victim and that he and the victim resided in 
the same household. 
The father next contended that even if he was correctly 
charged under section 1203.066, he should still have been 
granted probation. He based this contention on section 
1203.066(c)1 which provides that section 1203.066(a)(7), (8) and 
(9) are inapplicable if the trial court makes the following four 
findings: 
(1) The defendant is the victim's natural parent 
... who has lived in the household. (2) Imprison-
ment of the defendant is not in the best interest 
of the child. (3) Rehabilitation of the defendant is 
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066 (West Supp. 1985). 
5.Id. 
6.Id. 
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(c) (West Supp. 1985). 
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feasible in a recognized treatment program 
designed to deal with child molestation, and if the 
defendant is to remain in the household, a pro-
gram that is specifically designed to deal with mo-
lestation within the family. (4) There is no threat 
of physical harm to the child victim if there is no 
imprisonment.8 
579 
The trial court found that there was no locally available re-
cognized treatment center and that there existed a potential for 
physical harm to the daughter if the father was not imprisoned. 
The trial court also stated that even if the requirements of 
1203.066(c) were met, the facts of this particular case would 
make probation inappropriate. The court specifically noted the 
long period of time during which the father carried on his con-
duct, the exceedingly vulnerable position of his victim and the 
apparent premeditation of the father's conduct as reasons for 
denial of probation in this case. 
The court of appeal found that the trial court's ruling did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that 
the focus of such a decision should be on the availability of an 
effective rehabilitation program and the relative safety of the 
child. 
The court of appeal declined to undertake an evidentiary 
analysis of the trial court's exercise of discretion. The court may 
have accorded the trial court a greater degree of discretion be-
cause the case involved a sex offense. This is especially apparent 
regarding the trial court's finding that there was no local pro-
gram dealing with child molestation. The court of appeal stated 
that to qualify under section 1203.066, the treatment program 
must "involve more than the availability of a psychologist or 
psychiatrist dealing with the problems on an ad-hoc basis." 
The court's restrictive construction of the statute on this 
point may result in the incarceration of offenders when a more 
constructive alternative is available. However, the trial court 
found that even if there had been a qualified rehabilitation pro-
gram, releasing the father in this case may have endangered the 
daughter. The court of appeal's affirmation of the trial court's 
8. [d. 
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denial of probation is justified on this basis alone. 
2. Defense of reasonable mistake not available to de-
fendant charged with lewd or lascivious conduct 
with a child under the age of fourteen. 
People v. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 685 P.2d 52, 205 Cal. Rptr. 
492 (1984). The California Supreme Court in People v. Olsen 
refused to allow a defense of reasonable mistake as to age in a 
case under Penal Code section 288(a) involving lewd or lascivi-
ous conduct with a child under the age of fourteen. 9 The court 
reasoned that Penal Code section 288 was enacted to further the 
strong policy of protecting young children and that the enact-
ment of Penal Code section 1203.066(a)(3)1° clearly indicated 
that the defense of reasonable mistake of age was not to be 
available. The court determined that recognizing such a defense 
would render this section meaningless. 
The female victim was fourteen years and ten months old at 
the time of the incident. Because there were guests staying at 
the family residence, the victim was spending nights in a trailer 
parked in the driveway. The victim's father discovered the de-
fendant and his codefendant in bed with the victim. The victim 
testified that defendant had asked to enter the trailer. She 
stated that she ignored him and went to sleep. She awoke to find 
the codefendant holding a knife at her throat. Under the threat 
of the knife, she engaged in sexual intercourse with the 
defendant. 
Id. 
She also testified that she knew the codefendant "pretty 
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985) provides: 
Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or 
lascivious act including any of the acts constituting other 
crimes provided for in Part 1 of this code upon or with the 
body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age 
of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, gratify-
ing the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of 
such child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned 
in the state prison for a term of three, six, or eight years. 
10. This subsection provides that probation will not be granted to U[al person con-
victed of a violation of Section 288 and who was a stranger to the child victim or made 
friends with the victim for the purpose of committing an act of violation of Section 288, 
unless the defendant honestly believed the victim was 14 years old or older." CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1203.066(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
6
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well" for about a year, had seen him a few days before the inci-
dent and that she considered the codefendant her boyfriend. 
She stated that she was good friends with the defendant and 
had had sexual relations short of intercourse with both men. Fi-
nally, she testified that she had told both defendants that she 
was over the age of sixteen. 
The trial court found both men guilty of violating Penal 
Code section 288(a).1l The defendant was sentenced to three 
years in state prison. He appealed, contending that a good faith 
reasonable mistake of age constitutes a defense to a section 288 
charge. 
The text of section 288 does not indicate whether the rea-
sonable mistake defense is applicable to a charge of lewd and 
lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of fourteen. The 
court therefore turned to other cases that discussed this defense. 
In People v. Vogel/ 2 the California Supreme Court held that a 
good faith belief that a previous marriage had been terminated 
was a valid defense to a charge of bigamy. The Vogel court 
noted the legislative declarations in Penal Code section 20,13 
which requires that there be a union of act and intent in every 
crime and in Penal Code section 26,14 which provides that igno-
rance of or mistake of fact disproves criminal intent. Relying on 
these two sections and Vogel, the court in People v. Her-
nandezUS allowed a reasonable mistake defense in a statutory 
rape case. The victim in that case was seventeen years, nine 
months old and had consented to sexual intercourse. The court 
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1970 and Supp. 1985). For relevant statutory 
language, see supra note 9. 
12. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956). 
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970) provides that "[tlo constitute crime there 
must be unity of act and intent. In every crime or public offense there must exist a 
union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence." 
Id. 
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985) provides: 
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those be-
longing to the following classes: ... Persons who committed 
the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or 
mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent . . . . 
Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged 
through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there 
was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence. 
15. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964). 
7
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held the essential element of criminal intent is missing when the 
person engaging in sexual intercourse with a minor reasonably 
believes the minor to be over eighteen years of age. 
The Hernandez court, however, stated that its holding was 
not intended to extend to cases involving acts with an "infant" 
female, and that it was not withdrawing from the sound public 
policy of protecting the sexually naive female. 16 Three post-Her-
nandez court of appeal decisions refused to apply the Her-
nandez rule in cases involving the offense of lewd and lascivious 
conduct with a child under the age of fourteen. The court in 
People v. Toberl7 rejected the defense in a case involving a ten 
year old victim. The court noted that a refusal to distinguish 
between a child and an adult may be characteristic of those who 
engage in the kind of conduct which falls under section 288, and 
relied upon the Hernandez court's statement that a good faith 
mistake as to age is untenable when the victim is of "tender 
years." 
The court in People v. Toliverl6 distinguished between a vi-
olation of section 288, which does not involve consent of any 
sort, and statutory rape, in which a male who believes in good 
faith that a female is over eighteen therefore believes that she 
can consent to sexual intercourse. It noted that the purpose of 
section 288 was to protect infants and children, and that there 
was no reason why the age of fourteen should not continue to be 
the dividing line between a child and a mature person. IS 
The third case, People v. Gutierrez,20 relied on Tober and 
Toliver and the public policy considerations upon which those 
decisions were based, declaring them to be based upon a ration-
ale that is still sound.21 
The California Supreme Court in Olsen found the reasoning 
of the three court of appeal cases and the dictum in Hernandez 
to be persuasive. The court agreed that section 288 was enacted 
16. [d. at 536, 393 P.2d at 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365. 
17. 241 Cal. App. 2d 66, 50 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966). 
18. 270 Cal. App. 2d 492, 75 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1969). 
19. [d. at 496, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 822. 
20. 80 Cal. App. 3d 829, 145 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1978). 
21. [d. at 834-35, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 827. 
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for the purpose of protecting children of tender years. That pub-
lic policy, the court determined, compels a conclusion that a rea-
sonable mistake of age is not a defense under section 288. 
The court found further support for its holding in various 
legislative prOVISIOns. Under. Penal Code section 
1203.066(a)(3)(A), certain individuals convicted under 288 may 
be eligible for probation if they "honestly and reasonably be-
lieved the victim was 14 years or older." This, plus the fact that 
no mistake of age was included in section 288, strongly indicates 
that the legislature did not intend to permit such a defense. If 
such a defense were recognized, the question of probation would 
never arise, rendering section 1203.066(a)(3)(A) a nullity. The 
courts are extremely reluctant to construe statutes in such a way 
as to render existing provisions unnecessary.22 
The court also found it significant that children under the 
age of fourteen are given special protection under other state 
laws, and cited Penal Code section 27123 which provides for pun-
ishment for desertion of a child under fourteen, and section 
271(a),U which makes it a crime to abandon or fail to maintain a 
child under fourteen. The severity of punishment for crimes in-
volving children under fourteen when compared to crimes with 
persons between fourteen and eighteen was also found to be an 
indication of the state's special policy of protection for those 
under fourteen. For example, the maximum punishment for a 
violation of section 288 is eight years in prison while the maxi-
mum penalty for unlawful sexual intercourse is one year in 
county jailor three years in state prison. 
Justice Grodin, in a concurring and dissenting opmIOn, 
agreed that the enactment of section 1203.0662& is persuasive ev-
idence that the legislature did not intend a good faith mistake of 
age to be a defense to a section 288 offense. Justice Grodin con-
tended, however, that imprisoning a person who acted with a 
reasonable belief and is guilty of no other offense "smacks of 
cruel and unusual punishment." He noted that normally a per-
22. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 52, 648 P.2d 935, 938, 
184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1982). 
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 271 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 271(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
9
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son cannot be convicted of a traditional crime absent a showing 
of fault and that strict liability crimes are almost always re-
stricted to violations of regulatory laws which carry with them 
no grave harm to the individual's reputation. 
Finally, Justice Grodin stated that the legislature, in section 
1203.066, has set a standard for reasonable mistake of age for a 
section 288 violation. When that standard is reached, it could be 
stated that "the defendant is acting in a way which is no differ-
ent from the way our society would expect a reasonable, careful, 
and law-abiding citizen to act." According to Justice Grodin, im-
posing criminal sanctions under these circumstances is 
intolerable. 
The California Supreme Court broke with the majority of 
jurisdictions by holding in Hernandez that statutory rape in-
volving victims between the ages of fourteen and eighteen was 
not a strict liability crime. The Hernandez court, however, ex-
plicitly refused to extend that policy to sexual acts with chil-
dren.28 The court has made it clear that, under section 288, an 
individual acts at his own peril. A key factor in these cases is the 
capacity of the woman to consent to engage in sexual activity. 
There is a conclusive presumption that a victim under the age of 
fourteen lacks this capacity. Protection is provided for all chil-
dren under the age of fourteen regardless of the offender's rea-
sonable beliefs. As for the offender, it is sufficient that in cases 
of genuine and reasonable mistake the legislature has provided 
for probation under section 1203.66. 
3. Evidence that a victim is suffering from rape 
trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that a 
rape has occurred. 
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. 
Rptr. 450 (1984). In People v. Bledsoe, the California Supreme 
Court held that although expert testimony on the effects of rape 
may be admitted for a variety of purposes, testimony that a rape 
victim is suffering from "rape trauma syndrome" is not admissi-
ble to prove that a rape has in fact occurred. The court con-
cluded, however, that the admission of the testimony in this case 
26. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 536, 393 P.2d 673, 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 
365 (1964). 
10
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was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the court upheld the con-
viction. 
Melanie, age fourteen, asked the defendant for a ride home 
from a party. On the way to her home, the defendant told her 
that he needed to stop at his home and pick up some money. 
While inside, the defendant attacked Melanie and threatened to 
cut her throat if she did not have sexual intercourse with him. 
Melan~e, believing that the defendant was holding a knife, did 
what the defendant ordered. After engaging in intercourse, the 
defendant returned Melanie to the party, where she told her 
friends what had occurred. The defendant was arrested and 
charged with (1) forcible rape; (2) use of a deadly weapon during 
the commission of a rape; (3) assault with a deadly weapon; and 
(4) false imprisonment. 
At trial, the prosecution called a rape counselor who had 
treated Melanie after the incident. The counselor testified, over 
the objections of defense counsel, that Melanie was suffering 
from rape trauma syndrome. The counselor further testified that 
rape trauma syndrome is an umbrella term which describes the 
behavior of rape victims in 99.9 % of all rape cases. In response 
to a question from the prosecution, the counselor concluded that 
based on her experience and her work with Melanie, it was obvi-
ous that Melanie was suffering from rape trauma syndrome. 
The jury found the defendant guilty of forcible rape but de-
termined that he had not used a weapon during the commission 
of the rape and therefore found him not guilty of assault with a 
deadly weapon. The jury could not reach a verdict on the false 
imprisonment charge. The charge was dropped at the request of 
the prosecution. 
Defendant appealed, contending that the court erred in ad-
mitting the counselor's testimony on rape trauma syndrome. 
The defendant maintained that (1) the trial court's action was 
inconsistent with People v. Guthreau27 and People v. Clark,28 
where the admission of certain expert testimony of a rape coun-
selor was held to,be in error; and (2) in any event, the testimony 
27. 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980). 
28. 109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 167 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1980). 
11
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should not have been admitted because rape trauma syndrome 
does not meet the Frye29 standard of reliability to determine the 
admissibility of new scientific methods of proof.30 
The California Supreme Court distinguished Guthreau and 
Clark from the instant case. In those cases, police counselors tes-
tified that the victims' resistance was reasonable. The Guthreau 
and Clark courts held that the issue in rape prosecution is not 
rape in the abstract but whether the resistance was sufficient to 
reasonably manifest the victim's refusal to consent to the sexual 
act. The courts in Guthreau and Clark therefore held that ex-
pert opinion that the victim's resistance was reasonable was ir-
relevant. In Bledsoe the rape counselor did not testify concern-
ing the reasonableness of Melanie's resistance but rather about 
the emotional behavior exhibited by Melanie after the rape 
which indicated that she was suffering from rape trauma syn-
drome. Therefore the California Supreme Court held Guthreau 
and Clark to be inapposite. 
The question of whether evidence of rape trauma syndrome 
is admissible under the Frye standard presented a more difficult 
issue. The test set out by the court in Frye is that in order to 
admit expert testimony which is deduced from a scientific prin-
ciple or theory, the principle or theory must be sufficiently es-
tablished to have gained general acceptance in that particular 
field of science.31 In the few cases in which rape trauma syn-
drome has arisen as an issue, the defendant raised as a defense 
an aspect of the victim's conduct which shed doubt on the vic-
tim's allegations of having been raped.32 Accordingly, evidence 
on rape trauma syndrome was allowed to rebut these defenses. 
The supreme court found that allowing such testimony in these 
cases serves to inform the jury of findings of professional re-
search on the subject of a victim's reaction to sexual assault. 
The court distinguished Bledsoe from those cases where the 
29. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
30. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976). 
31. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
32. See, e.g., Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 478·79, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 792 
(1982) (delay in reporting assault); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 435-37, 657 P.2d 
1215, 1219·20 (1983) (inconsistent post· incident statements by fourteen year old incest 
victim). 
12
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evidence was admitted to rebut an inference of the defendant 
concerning the victim's conduct. In Bledsoe, there was no incon-
sistent evidence regarding the conduct of Melanie. The victim 
promptly reported the attack, displayed a severe emotional reac-
tion and suffered bruises, all of which supported the fact that 
she had been raped. The court therefore held that there was no 
need to introduce the evidence of rape trauma syndrome. The 
court determined that the prosecutor was introducing the evi-
dence to prove that a rape had, in fact, occurred and that this 
was Improper. 
Cases upholding the admissibility of expert testimony con-
cerning the "battered child syndrome" provided an apt analogy. 
However, the court made an important distinction between rape 
trauma syndrome and battered child syndrome. The criteria for 
battered child syndrome was established to further the efforts of 
authorities to identify and protect children who were abused. 
Rape trauma syndrome, on the other hand, was designed pri-
marily to serve as a counseling device to aid psychologists in 
treating the emotional problems of rape victims. The court de-
termined that since rape trauma syndrome was developed for an 
entirely different purpose than the battered child syndrome, 
rape trauma syndrome cannot be used in the same manner in 
court. It therefore held that expert testimony that a woman suf-
fers from rape trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that 
the woman was raped. 
The court determined, however, that the error in admitting 
the counselor's testimony in this case was not prejudicial. Me-
lanie told her friends that she had been attacked immediately 
after being returned to the party. She had several bruises which 
were not explained by the defense. The court held the remaining 
evidence to be sufficient corroboration of her testimony that she 
had been raped. The court concluded that although evidence of 
the rape counselor should not have been admitted, it did no 
more than provide the jury with information already at their 
disposal. 
In Bledsoe, the supreme court acted cautiously in not al-
lowing evidence of rape trauma syndrome to come into evidence 
to prove the fact of rape. In doing so, the court sought to protect 
defendants from testimony which may appear reliable solely be-
13
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cause it is offered by a rape counselor. This approach may be 
appropriate where, as in this case, the defendant did not put the 
victim's post-rape conduct at issue and therefore testimony re-
garding the syndrome may be both extraneous and damaging to 
the defendant. However, where the victim's post-rape conduct is 
at issue, expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is both ma-
terial and relevant and should be admitted. 
B. Felony Child Abuse 
1. Felony child abuse may not serve as the underly-
ing felony to support a conviction of second degree 
murder under the felony murder theory. 
People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. 
Rptr. 311 (1984). In People v. Smith, the California Supreme 
Court held that felony child abuse cannot serve as the underly-
ing felony to support a conviction of second degree felony mur-
der. The court reasoned that since the acts constituting felony 
child abuse in this case were an integral part of the homicide, 
the offense merged into the homicide. 
Defendant and her two daughters, Beth and Amy, lived 
with a man named Foster. Defendant became angry at Amy and 
began beating her, knocking her to the floor. Foster joined de-
fendant to "assist" her in disciplining Amy. Beth testified that 
both Foster and defendant repeatedly struck Amy with both 
their hands and a paddle and also bit her. Eventually, defendant 
knocked the child backwards. Amy fell, hit her head on the 
closet door and suffered a severe head injury. Defendant and 
Foster took Amy to the hospital where she died later the same 
evening. 
The trial court gave a second degree felony murder instruc-
tion.88 The instruction informed the jury that an unlawful kill-
ing, whether intentional, unintentional, or accidental is second 
degree murder if it occurs during the commission of a felony in-
herently dangerous to human life, and that felony child abuse is 
such a crime. Defendant contended that on the facts of this case, 
the crime of felony child abuse was an integral part and in-
cluded in fact within the homicide, and therefore it merged into 
33. CALJIC No. 8.32 (4th ed. 1979). 
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the homicide under the reasoning of People v. Ireland. 34 
In Ireland, the California Supreme Court held the felony 
murder doctrine inapplicable to felonies which are an integral 
part of and are included in fact within the homicide.311 The jury 
in Ireland was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty 
of second degree felony murder if it determined that the homi-
cide occurred in the commission of the underlying felony of as-
sault with a deadly weapon.36 The supreme court disagreed, 
holding that the application of the felony murder doctrine 
should not be extended beyond its rational function since to do 
so would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue 
of intent where a homicide has been committed as a result of a 
felonious assault, a category which includes the majority of all 
homicides. 
In People v. Burton,37 the California Supreme Court refined 
the Ireland rule by adding the caveat that the felony murder 
doctrine may nevertheless apply if the underlying offense was 
committed with an independent felonious purpose. Even if the 
felony was included in the facts of the homicide and was integral 
thereto, a further inquiry is required to determine whether the 
homicide was the result of an independent felonious purpose or 
a single course of conduct with a single purpose. Therefore, in 
cases like Ireland, where the purpose of the conduct was the 
very assault which caused the death, the felony murder rule is 
inapplicable. In a homicide in the course of an armed robbery, 
for example, there is the independent purpose to acquire money 
or property belonging to another. In such an instance, the felony 
murder rule would apply. 
Felony child abuse as defined by section 273(a)38 can occur 
in a variety of circumstances. The definition is broad and in-
cludes both active and passive conduct: child abuse by direct as-
sault and endangering the child by extreme neglect. The princi-
34. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969) (the defendant and his 
wife were experiencing serious marital problems which culminated in defendant shooting 
and killing his wife). 
35. [d. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198. 
36. [d. 
37. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 387, 491 P.2d 793, 801, 99 Cal. Rptr. I, 9 (1971). 
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
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pIes of Ireland and Burton would bar the use of the felony 
murder doctrine where the purpose of the child abuse is the very 
assault which results in the death of the child.39 In the instant 
case, the California Supreme Court found that the homicide was 
the result of child abuse by direct assault. Therefore, the under-
lying felony was unquestionably an "integral part of and in-
cluded in fact" of the homicide within the meaning of Ireland. 
The Smith court furthermore could conceive of no independent 
purpose for the conduct. The ostensible purpose of the felony 
murder rule is to deter negligent or accidental killing that may 
occur in the course of committing that felony. When someone 
willfully assaults a child, the court could not see how the felony 
murder rule would work to deter a person from killing acciden-
tally or negligently in the course of that felony. The court, de-
spite its expressed abhorrence of child abuse, refused to deviate 
from the Ireland rule simply because the victim was a child 
rather than an adult. Further, the court concluded that the fel-
ony murder rule does not serve any deterrent function. 
39. There are several cases in which the second degree felony murder doctrine has 
withstood an Ireland attack. People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697 
(1970) (underlying felony was furnishing narcotics); People v. Calzada, 13 Cal. App. 3d 
603, 91 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1970) (underlying felony was driving under the influence of nar-
cotics); People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177,481 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971) (under-
lying felony was administering poison); People v. Shockley, 79 Cal. App. 3d 669, 145 Cal. 
Rptr. 200 (1978) (underlying felony was child abuse by willful cruelty and endangering); 
People v. Northrop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1982) (underlying felony 
was child abuse by physical beating). Except for Northrop, however, none of these deci-
sions involved an underlying felony that had as its principal purpose an assault on the 
person of the victim. 
In Northrop, there was evidence that their child's death was caused by organ and 
bone injuries resulting from the infliction of blunt force. The Northrop court declared 
that there was no bar to application of the felony murder rule because felony child abuse 
may be committed without either an intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, and 
thus has a felonious design independent of the resulting homicide. Northrop, 132 Cal. 
App. 3d at 1036, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 202. The supreme court in Smith, however, held that 
the Northrop court's conclusion that there was an independent purpose does not follow 
from its premise concerning possible lack of intent. The Northrop court relied on People 
v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177, 481 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971), where the supreme 
court held that the felony of poisoning did not merge into the reSUlting homicide. The 
Mattison court held that because the underlying felony was not done with the intent to 
commit injury which would cause death, it had an independent design. Id. at 85, 481 
P.2d at 198-99, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91. The independent design in Mattison, however, 
was to furnish a dangerous substance for financial gain. The Smith court stated that, by 
definition, felony child abuse occurs only under circumstances or conditions likely to 
produce great bodily harm or death. Therefore, the Smith court concluded that it is 
untenable to assert that there is an independent design when the crime of felony child 
abuse of the assaultive variety is willfully committed. To the extent that Northrop is 
inconsistent with the court's reasoning in Smith, it was disapproved. 
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In Smith, the California Supreme Court refused to allow ac-
tive and willful felony child abuse to serve as the underlying fel-
ony to a second degree felony murder instruction. The decision 
stems from the court's unwillingness to extend the felony mur-
der rule which allows a murder conviction without considering 
the intent or malice of the defendant. Despite the court's dislike 
of the felony murder rule, it has long recognized the need to re-
tain the doctrine for use in certain situations where strong coun-
tervailing policies so dictate. In this case, where the counter-
vailing policy of protecting children from assaultive child abuse 
is so compelling, the court should have reexamined the possible 
deterrent effects of the rule instead of concluding that there will 
be no deterrence simply because assaultive child abuse involves 
a willful act. 
C. Child Stealing 
1. Parent not guilty of child stealing where reconcili-
ation cancels an interlocutory custody decree. 
People u. HQward, 36 Cal. 3d 852, 686 P.2d 644, 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 124 (1984). In People u. Howard, the California Supreme 
Court held that a parent was not guilty of child stealing40 where 
a reconciliation effectively canceled an interlocutory custody de-
cree. The cancellation of the interlocutory decree meant that the 
state had failed to establish the existence of a child custody or-
der, one of the essential elements of the crime of child stealing. 
The court therefore ruled that the trial court's failure to instruct 
the jury concerning reconciliation constituted reversible error. 
In Howard, the parties obtained an interlocutory judgment 
of dissolution in July 1978 whereby the wife received custody of 
the couple's two children. Defendant was awarded visitation 
rights. After one month, defendant moved back into the family 
home and the couple resumed marital relations. After two years, 
defendant went to Colorado to care for his father. The wife con-
cluded that this signaled the couple's final breakup and signed a 
request for a final judgment of dissolution. Defendant believed 
that his wife was not properly caring for the children and re-
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West Supp. 1985), added by 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1399, § 
11, amended by 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 990, § 4, further amended by 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1207, 
§ 3. Defendant was convicted of violating the 1976 version of section 278.5. Therefore, 
subsequent references to this section will be to the 1976 version. 
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turned to California in August 1980. He took the children after 
promising the babysitter that he would return in two hours. He 
in fact moved the children to Colorado. He refused to allow the 
children to telephone their mother. 
Defendant was charged with and convicted of child steal-
ing.41 He appealed on two grounds. First, he contended that the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reconciliation. 
Second, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury concerning good faith mistake. The California Supreme 
Court determined that defendant's first contention was meritori-
ous and therefore did not address the second ground for appeal. 
In order to obtain a conviction. under Penal Code section 
278.5, the prosecution must establish the existence of a valid 
child custody order.42 The California Supreme Court found no 
cases which addressed the question of whether a reconciliation 
by a husband and wife cancels a child custody order granted as 
part of an interlocutory decree of dissolution. The court did, 
however, find that cases in the area of spousal support provided 
significant guidance. These cases have held that reconciliation 
and resumption of marital relations cancel an interlocutory 
order.43 
In In re Marriage of Modnick,44 the California Supreme 
Court held that when a husband and wife reconcile following an 
interlocutory decree, the right to a final decree is extinguished 
and the couple is entitled to the restoration of all marital rights 
and obligations. The Modnick court also held that in determin-
ing whether a reconciliation has occurred, the court need only 
examine the intent of the parties to permanently reunite as hus-
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West Supp. 1985). 
42. Section 278.5(a) provides that "[e)very person who in violation of the physical 
custody provisions of a custody order, judgment, or decree takes, detains, conceals, or 
retains the child with the intent to deprive another person of his or her rights to physical 
custody or visitation shall be punished .... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5(a) (West. Supp. 
1985). 
43. See, e.g., Harrold v. Harrold, 100 Cal. App. 2d 601, 609, 224 P.2d 66, 70-71 
(1950); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 202 Cal. App. 2d 55, 59-63, 20 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532-35 
(1962); Purdy v. Purdy, 138 Cal. App. 2d 402, 405, 291 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1956); Morgan v. 
Morgan, 106 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192, 234 P.2d 782, 784 (1951); Peters v. Peters, 16 Cal. 
App. 2d 383, 386-87, 60 P.2d 313, 315 (1936). 
44. 33 Cal. 3d 897, 911, 663 P.2d 187, 195, 191 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1983). 
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band and wife.46 This intent must be clearly proved by the party 
asserting that a reconciliation has occurred.46 
In Howard, the California Supreme Court determined that 
there was a reconciliation as a matter of law. After obtaining the 
interlocutory order, the couple lived together for two years and 
held themselves out as husband and wife. They engaged in mari-
tal acts such as signing a joint rental agreement, maintaining a 
joint checking account and sharing the responsibility for raising 
their children. During the trial, the wife testified that she had 
earlier failed to tell the truth when, at the time she signed the 
request for a final judgment of dissolution, she stated that she 
and her husband were not reconciled. Finally, neither the hus-
band nor the wife took steps to enforce the interlocutory decree. 
Applying the Modnick test, the court determined that the 
couple had an unequivocal and unconditional intention to reu-
nite as husband and wife. Since the couple had reunited before a 
final decree was entered, the court concluded that the interlocu-
tory decree was canceled. Absent the required child custody or-
der, the court reversed the conviction. 
Chief Justice Bird, who wrote for the majority, also wrote a 
concurring opinion in which she addressed the defendant's sec-
ond defense. The Chief Justice asserted that an honest, good 
faith albeit mistaken belief that there has been a reconciliation 
constitutes a defense to violation of Penal Code section 278.5. 
Relying on the legislative history of that section and the rules of 
statutory construction, she determined that the statute con-
tained a specific intent element. For a "noncustodial parent" to 
be convicted under this section, it must be proved that he or she 
had the specific intent to deprive the legal custodian of his or 
her right of custody pursuant to a custody order, judgment or 
decree. Therefore, the Chief Justice reasoned, even if the child 
custody agreement in Howard was still in effect, the husband's 
good faith belief that the order was invalid would constitute a 
valid defense, requiring reversal of the trial court verdict. 
Justice Mosk, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's in-
45. [d. at 912 n.14, 663 P.2d at 196 n.14, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.14. 
46. [d. at 911, 663 P.2d at 196, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 638. 
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terpretation of both the facts and the applicable law. He dis-
puted the majority's determination that there had been a recon-
ciliation as a matter of law. He would have held that at most 
there was an attempted reconciliation which fell short of being 
successful. He persuasively argued that the husband's behavior 
in lying to the babysitter, moving the children to Colorado and 
not allowing the children to telephone their mother was incon-
sistent with a good faith belief in the invalidity of the child cus-
tody order. Justice Mosk argued that the husband violated the 
spirit of the statute by resorting to the type of self-help measure 
the statute was intended to prevent. However, this argument 
only addresses Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion, since the 
majority based its holding on its determination that the interloc-
utory decree was invalid. Therefore, while Justice Mosk's argu-
ment was persuasive, it was not relevant to the majority's hold-
ing in the case. 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. Community Property 
1. Wife entitled to that portion of the husband's dis-
ability which represents her share of community 
property interest in his retirement benefits. 
In re Marriage of Justice, 157 Cal. App. 3d 82, 204 Cal. 
Rptr. 6 (2nd Dist. 1984). In In re Marriage of Justice, the court 
of appeal affirmed a trial court order that the wife be paid that 
portion of the husband's disability pension which represented 
her share of the community property interest in his retirement 
benefits. The court followed the rule established by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Stenquist"7 that only 
the excess of a disability pension over the amount of regular re-
tirement benefits was separate property; the remaining amount 
in effect replaced ordinary retirement pay and was a community 
asset. 
The husband was a police officer who retired on a disability 
pension two months before his twenty-year retirement date. The 
disability was based on an injury received eight years earlier. 
Under a prior dissolution agreement, the wife was to receive 
payments of her share of the husband's retirement benefits upon 
47. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). 
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the arrival of his twenty-year retirement date, regardless of 
whether he retired. Upon reaching the retirement date, however, 
the husband refused to pay, contending that he was receiving 
disability rather than a retirement pension. 
The wife obtained an order from the trial court directing 
the husband to pay her her share of the retirement funds. The 
husband appealed, relying on the holding in In re Marriage of 
Jones. 48 In Jones, the California Supreme Court held that disa-
bility benefits are separate property when the right to a service 
pension has not vested at the time that a disability retirement is 
taken.'s The court in Justice, citing Stenquist, pointed out that 
the holding in Jones was overturned a year later in In re Mar-
riage of Brown.IlO Brown held that both vested and non vested 
pension rights arising from employment during marriage were 
community property assets. III 
Stenquist involved a serviceman who elected to take a disa-
bility pension rather than a service pension, and then claimed 
that the entire disability pension was his separate property 
under the reasoning of Jones. The California Supreme Court re-
jected that claim on two grounds. First, the court stated that 
permitting the election of a disability pension which operated to 
defeat a community property interest in a longevity pension 
would violate the principle that one spouse cannot invoke a con-
dition wholly within his or her control which results in the loss 
of community interest of the other spouse.1I2 Second, the court 
held that only that portion of a disability pension in excess of an 
ordinary retirement pension is property allocated to the disabil-
ity itself, where the primary purpose of the disability payments 
is to compensate for the loss of earnings due to premature 
retirement. 113 
Since the husband in Justice had not accumulated the num-
ber of years required to enable him to choose between a disabil-
48. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975). 
49. A vested pension is one not forfeited by termination of employment. In re Mar· 
riage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1976). 
50. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). 
51. Id. at 851-52, 544 P.2d at 569-70, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42. 
52. Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 786-87, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14. 
53.Id. 
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ity or a service pension, the court determined that the second 
factor in Stenquist was applicable and looked to the primary 
purpose of the benefits rather than the label placed on the bene-
fits. In this case, the police department based both service pen-
sions and disability pensions on a "normal pension base." No 
police officer could receive both a disability and service pension. 
Therefore in Justice disability benefits were largely intended to 
replace retirement benefits. 
California courts, recognizing that pension benefits are be-
coming an increasingly significant part of employee compensa-
tion, are following a course markedly different than that sug-
gested by Jones just ten years ago. Jones had held that a 
community property interest in a nonvested retirement pension 
was' an expectancy, not a property interest. The change of law 
over the past decade demonstrates that courts now recognize 
that characterizing a disability pension as separate property 
under the circumstances present in Justice impairs a community 
interest of the spouse which is deserving of judicial protection. 
As the time for retirement draws near, the pension may be the 
most important asset of the marriage. Disability retirements, 
even though taken before service retirement benefits have 
vested, represent in large part service retirement payments. The 
courts now recognize that to deprive one spouse of a share in 
that property would result in an inequitable division of the mar-
ital community property. 
2. Separate property of a spouse which is converted 
to joint tenancy during the marriage or is used to 
acquire joint tenancy property during marriage is 
presumed to be community property. 
In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr. 
341 (1st Dist. 1984); In re Marriage of Anderson, 154 Cal. App. 
3d 572, 201 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1st Dist. 1984). Several courts of ap-
peal decisions have interpreted recently enacted Civil Code sec-
tions 4800.1114 and 4800.2.~5 In In re Marriage of Neal, the court 
held that a residence owned as separate property by a putative 
spouse prior to marriage is presumed to be community property 
when, during marriage, she placed title to the property in joint 
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1985). 
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1985). 
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tenancy with her husband. In In re Marriage of Anderson, the 
court likewise held that the section 4800.1 presumption arises 
upon the conveyance of title to both spouses as joint tenants 
during marriage notwithstanding that the property may have 
been owned by one spouse before marriage. The Anderson court 
further held that the husband was entitled to reimbursement for 
his separate property contribution under Civil Code section 
4800.2. 
In Neal, a house owned by the wife prior to marriage was 
transferred to joint tenancy with her husband. This change in 
title was required by a lender as a prerequisite to a refinancing 
arrangement. The wife claimed that she and her husband orally 
agreed that the house would remain her separate property. The 
trial court determined the house to be separate property pursu-
ant to the oral agreement. The husband appealed. 
In Anderson, a house owned by the husband prior to mar-
riage was transferred to joint tenancy with his wife. This change 
was required by a lender as a prerequisite to a home equity loan. 
At trial, the husband testified that he had no idea that he was 
giving his wife a one-half interest in the house. The trial court 
determined that the house was community property based on 
the husband's conveyance during the home equity loan transac-
tion and ordered the husband to pay the wife a one-half share of 
the value of the house. The husband appealed. 
In In re Marriage of Lucas/'S the California Supreme Court 
distinguished the "common law" presumption arising out of the 
form of title from the general presumption set forth in Civil 
Code section 5110117 that property acquired during marriage is 
community property. The statutory presumption could be rebut-
ted by tracing the source of funds that were used to acquire the 
property to separate property. The common law presumption 
could not be rebutted in this fashion; it required an understand-
ing or agreement, either written or oral, between the parties to 
rebut the presumption.1I8 The Lucas court also held that absent 
an agreement to the contrary, the parties' contribution from sep-
arate funds toward the acquisition of community property was 
56. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). 
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983). 
58. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857. 
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considered a gift to the community.1i9 
The legislature responded to the Lucas decision by enacting 
California Civil code sections 4800.1 and 4800.2.60 Section 4800.1 
superseded the "common law" presumption of title concerning 
property acquired during marriage in joint tenancy. It also ex-
panded section 5110, which had created a presumption that a 
single family residence acquired by a couple in joint tenancy 
during marriage was presumed to be community property. Sec-
tion 4800.1 created the pres~mption that all property acquired 
in joint tenancy during marriage is community property. Unlike 
the rule set out in Lucas, section 4800.1 requires a writing to 
rebut the presumption. 
Section 4800.2, unlike section 4800.1, applies to all commu-
nity property, not just property held in joint tenancy. Absent a 
written waiver, section 4800.2 requires that a party be reim-
bursed for contributions to the acquisition of property to the ex-
tent the party can trace the contributions to a separate property 
source. This section overrules Lucas, insofar as it failed to recog-
nize the parties' separate contribution to the acquisition of com-
munity property absent an oral or written agreement.61 
The California Legislature stated that the new provisions 
would apply to proceedings commenced before the date of enact-
ment on January 1, 1984 to the extent that the division of prop-
erty was not yet fina1. 62 Neal and Anderson both applied the 
statute retroactively without addressing whether retroactive ap-
plication was proper.6S 
59. Id. at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858. 
60. Stats. 1983, ch. 342 § 4, 1983 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 36 (West) (codified at CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1985)); stats. 1983, ch. 342 § 2, 1983 Cal. Adv. Legis. 
Servo 36 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1985)). 
61. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 585. 
62. Stats. 1983, ch. 342 § 4, 1983 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 36 (West) (codified at CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1985)). 
63. The two courts that did address the issue of retroactivity reached opposite re-
sults. In In re Marriage of Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 28-29, 202 Cal. Rptr. 646, 652 
(1984), the court held that although the normal rule was not to apply a statute retroac-
tively, where the intent of the legislature was clear, retroactive application was war-
ranted. It further held that section 4800.1 did not violate due process because retroactive 
application of the statute did not interfere with vested rights; it merely shifted the evi-
dentiary burden of proof where a joint tenancy deed was involved. Id. at 30, 202 Cal. 
Rptr. at 653. 
Cf. In re Marriage of Milse, 159 Cal. App. 3d 471 (1984), hg. granted, November 21, 
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In Neal, the court reasoned that absent legislative intent to 
the contrary, the language of section 4800.1 could be construed 
not to apply to separate property which is placed (rather than 
acquired) in joint tenancy with the other spouse during mar-
riage. Direct evidence of legislative intent, however, appears in 
the reports of the senate committee which considered Assembly 
Bill 26.64 The report states that section 4800.1 governs property 
acquired before the marriage when the title is taken in joint ten-
ancy during the marriage. The Neal court held, therefore, that 
the change in title from separate property to joint tenancy dur-
ing the marriage established a presumption which could be re-
butted only by a writing expressing a contrary intent. No such 
writing was present in Neal. 
In Anderson, the court similarly reasoned that the legisla-
tive purpose of section 4800.1 was to expand the family law 
court's jurisdiction over assets that spouses frequently hold in 
joint tenancy, thereby allowing a sensible disposition of all mari-
tal property. 
The court further held that the new statute's purpose was 
to avoid the inequities of Lucas,6r, where the presumption of a 
gift to the community often required the equal division of prop-
erty taken in joint tenancy, despite a showing that one spouse 
contributed a substantial portion from his or her separate prop-
erty. The court therefore concluded that the husband was enti-
tled to reimbursement for his separate property contribution 
under Civil Code section 4800.2 and remanded the case to the 
trial court with instructions to determine the value of the award. 
The award should be based on the value of the property at the 
time of its conversion to joint tenancy. 
The Neal court was highly critical of the legislature's enact-
ment of section 4800.1. The harsh result of this case was charac-
terized by the court as a "trap for the unwary" where different 
1984 (L.A. 32004), where the court held that retroactive application of section 4800.1 
would be an unconstitutional deprivation of a vested property right without due process 
of law. The court reasoned that the wife made an oral agreement preserving her separate 
property interest in reliance on Lucas. As a result, the wife's interest in the property 
became vested at the time of the agreement. 
64. 83 Sen. J. 4865-66 (1983). 
65. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858. 
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allocations of property are made based solely on the form of title 
by which the property was taken. However, the court merely ab-
dicated its role in remedying the injustice by concluding that 
since the inequity was created by statute, the cure should also 
come from the legislature. The Neal court could have reached a 
more just and equitable result by addressing the due process is-
sue and refusing to apply the statute retroactively. The Ander-
son court, on the other hand, applied section 4800.1 expansively 
without criticizing the legislature's judgment in enacting the 
statute. Both courts mitigated the harshness of section 4800.1, 
however, by reimbursing the spouse for the value of the property 
at the time of the transfer to joint tenancy rather than the lower 
value at the time of marriage. 
3. A debt owed to a spouse as part of a property set-
tlement agreement can be discharged in bank-
ruptcy if it arises out of a division of community 
property unrelated to alimony, support or 
maintenance. 
In re Marriage of Williams, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 203 Cal. 
Rptr. 909 (5th Dist. 1984). In In re Marriage of Williams, the 
court of appeal held that a former wife's debt to her ex-husband 
as part of a property settlement was dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy since it was unrelated to alimony, support or mainte-
nance. Therefore, the court reasoned, the trial court's decision to 
allow the husband an offset against monies he owed his ex-wife 
frustrated the purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws and the 
United States Constitution. 
During the dissolution hearing, the trial court, in order to 
equalize the division of community property and community 
debts, ordered the wife to execute and deliver to the husband a 
promissory note in the amount of $3,048.99 as well as certain 
other personal property. The court determined that thirty-six 
percent of her husband's retirement income was community 
property, of which the wife's share was $81.49 per month. Also 
under the dissolution decree, the husband was ordered to pay 
$9,426.37 and the wife $3,864.59 of community debts. 
The wife subsequently filed a petition in bankruptcy in 
which the husband was named as a creditor. This operated to 
discharge all of her debts, including the debt owed to her hus-
26
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band. The husband did not appear in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing to object to wife's discharge of these debts or to try to offset 
the amount of wife's indebtedness. Soon afterwards, the credi-
tors of the community filed law suits to satisfy their debts 
against the husband alone. 
The husband made no monthly payments out of his retire-
ment income to his wife on the ground that the wife had failed 
to comply with her obligation to deliver the note and the prop-
erty. Wife obtained a writ of execution and levied on husband's 
savings account for the arrearages of $3,895.00 in the monthly 
payments due her. The husband filed a notice of motion to 
quash the writ and to vacate the levy. 
The trial court granted the husband the right to offset the 
wife's indebtedness to him as well as any amounts he was re-
quired to pay creditors which the wife had been ordered to pay 
under the dissolution order. The trial court therefore quashed 
the writ and vacated the levy. 
Although California Civil Code section 438066 and California 
Code of Civil Procedure section 12867 give any court the inherent 
power to make all necessary orders to enforce or give effect to 
their judgments, this power is limited by the power given to the 
federal courts in adjudicating bankruptcy. It is established in 
both California68 and federallaw69 that while alimony judgments 
or judgments in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and sup-
port are not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy, settlements 
of property rights are so affected. In this case, the court of ap-
peal specifically stated that the $3,048.99 debt owed the hus-
band, which the wife subsequently discharged in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, was necessary for the equalization of the community 
property and was unrelated to alimony, support or maintenance. 
Therefore, the debt was property discharged in bankruptcy. 
The court of appeal further stated that the husband should 
have pursued his rights against his former wife before the bank-
ruptcy court since the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdic-
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4380 (West 1983). 
67. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128 (West 1982). 
68. Smalley v. Smalley, 176 Cal. App. 2d 374, 375, 1 Cal. Rptr. 440, 442 (1959). 
69. Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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tion to determine the dischargeability of the bankruptcy debt.70 
Section 523(a) of the' Bankruptcy Act71 allows a creditor to ex-
empt from dischargeable debts those debts which were incurred 
because of fraud. However, the creditor must request that the 
determination of fraud be made. If he fails to act, the debt will 
be discharged. In this case, the trial court found that the wife 
was guilty of fraud both in the dissolution action and in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, where she concealed assets from the 
court. However, since the husband did not appear at the bank-
ruptcy proceeding to raise these issues, the bankruptcy court 
had no choice but to discharge the debts. 
The court of appeal stated that the concept of equitable set-
off is well established in the state of California.72 However, sec-
tions 52473 and 5537• of the Bankruptcy Act were interpreted by 
the court as prohibiting a state court proceeding from reviving a 
debt already discharged in bankruptcy. The court of appeal held 
therefore that the lower court erred in granting husband's mo-
tion to quash the execution and vacate the levy. 
The court next addressed the question of whether the trial 
court could modify the property settlement agreement to take 
[d. 
Id. 
70. In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1982). 
71. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982). 
72. 3 B. WITKIN. CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 2552-53 (2d ed. 1971). 
73. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982). 
A discharge in a case under this title (1) voids any judg-
ment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment 
is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with 
respect to any debt discharged under Section 727, 944, 1141, 
or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is 
waived; (2) operates as an injunction against commencement 
of continuation of an action, the debt as a personal liability of 
the debtor, or from property of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such debt is waived . . . . 
74. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). 
Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sec-
tions 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any 
right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such credi-
tor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the 
case under this title against a claim of such creditor against 
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case, 
except to the extent that (1) the claim of such creditor against 
the debtor is disallowed other than under section 502(b)(3) of 
this title .... 
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into consideration the wife's discharge of her creditor's debts in 
bankruptcy. There were two conflicting policies involved: (1) the 
policy of the bankruptcy court to provide a new opportunity in 
life for persons, free from all outstanding debts, and (2) the pol-
icy of the family law court to require the bankrupt to pay all 
outstanding community debts.7~ 
Civil Code section 4812 was amended in 197776 to allow a 
court to consider a discharge in bankruptcy when awarding fu-
ture support. The legislative history of the bill explicitly states 
that it was intended to go as far as federal law would permit in 
reinstating debts owed to spouses.77 This, according to the court, 
demonstrated that the legislature wanted to redress the inequity 
of allowing a spouse, who has an obligation to share community 
debts, to discharge those debts in bankruptcy. However, it also 
showed, according to the court, that the legislature was aware of 
the supremacy of the federal bankruptcy laws and the limits this 
placed on the legislature to effect a remedy. The court concluded 
that there was nothing in the statute itself or in the legislative 
history that indicated that the legislature believed that it could 
modify the final property settlement itself notwithstanding the 
inequities which otherwise result. 
It was clear to the court in this case that the periodic pay-
ment of $81.49 due to the wife was not for alimony. The decree 
which provided for spousal support terminated in 1978. It was 
specifically determined that thirty-six percent of the husband's 
retirement fund was community property; the fact that the pay-
ments were being made monthly did not change them into ali-
mony or support payments. Since the monthly payment could 
not be characterized as alimony, support or maintenance, 
neither could it be modified under California Civil Code section 
4812 and the rationale of In re Marriage of Clements.78 Accord-
ingly, the court of appeal ruled that the trial court could not 
75. In re Marriage of Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 743-44, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756, 
759 (1982). 
76. CAL. ClV. CODE § 4812 (West 1983) provides that "[i]n the event obligations for 
property settlement to a spouse or support of a spouse are discharged in bankruptcy, the 
court may make all proper orders for the support of such spouse, as th court may deem 
just .... " Id. 
77. Legal Affairs Department of the Governor's Office Enrolled Bill Report for As-
sembly Bill No. 1269 (August 11, 1977). 
78. 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 743-46, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756, 759-61 (1982). 
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offset a community debt owed by wife to husband against 
monthly payments owed to the wife in satisfaction of.her com-
munity interest in her husband's retirement income. 
In conclusion, the court of appeal held that a wife's debt to 
her husband, which arose out of the division of community prop-
erty unrelated to alimony, support or maintenance, was dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. The court determined that allowing 
the trial court to offset the wife's discharged indebtedness 
against payments owed the wife by her husband, would violate 
the purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The court also held 
that the California law which permitted a modification of ali-
mony and support payments did not apply to this case since the 
payment due to the wife was her share of her husband's retire-
ment fund, which was determined to be community property. 
B. Decedent's Estates 
1. Putative spouse entitled to succeed to share of de-
cedent's separate property. 
Estate of Leslie, 37 Cal. 3d 186, 689 P.2d 133, 207 Cal. Rptr. 
561 (1984). In Estate of Leslie, the California Suprem~ Court 
held that a surviving putative spouse is entitled to succeed to a 
share of the decedent's separate property. The court, in reaching 
this decision, relied upon previous court of appeal decisions 
holding that a surviving putative spouse is entitled to a share of 
the decedent's quasi-marital property.79 The court also ex-
amined other cases where courts have accorded surviving puta-
tive spouses the same rights as surviving legal spouses. The 
court concluded that it would lend to anomalous and unjust re-
sults to accord surviving putative spouses the same rights as le-
gal spouses in some situations and not to accord a surviving pu-
tative spouse a share of the decedent's separate property. 
Appellant and decedent were married in Tijuana, Mexico. 
Since the marriage was never recorded as required by Mexican 
law, the marriage was not valid under Civil Code section 4104.80 
79. Quasi-marital property is property acquired during a putative marriage which 
would have been community property if acquired during a valid marriage. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 4452 (West 1983); Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 717, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780 
(1974). 
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (West 1983) provides that "[a)1I marriages contracted 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/4
1985] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 605 
Decedent died intestate. Respondent, a son from a previous 
marriage, filed a petition for letters of administration, challeng-
ing appellant's right to succeed to any of his deceased mother's 
separate property. The trial court recognized the existence of a 
putative marriage81 between appellant and decedent, but con-
cluded that appellant was not entitled to any of decedent's sepa-
rate property. He appealed. 
Court of appeal decisions have consistently held that a pu-
tative spouse is entitled to succeed to quasi-marital property.82 
These decisions also strongly suggested that putative spouses are 
entitled to a share of their decedent's separate property. In Es-
tate of Krone,83 the court of appeal awarded all of the commu-
nity estate to a putative spouse and held that the surviving 
spouse was entitled to the same share as she would have been as 
a legal spouse. Krone has been read to recognize a putative 
spouse as the equivalent of a legal spouse for purposes of succes-
sion.84 In other analogous contexts, courts of appeal have af-
forded surviving putative spouses the same rights as survIvmg 
legal spouses.81i 
The California Supreme Court concluded that principles of 
fairness mandate that putative spouses be allowed to succeed to 
a share of their decedent's separate property. In this case, the 
court held that at least one partner held a good faith belief in 
without this state, which would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the same 
were contracted, are valid in this state." Id. 
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West 1983) states that "[wlhenever a determination is 
made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both 
parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such 
party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse .... " Id. 
82. See, e.g., Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 769-70, 189 P.2d 741, 743 (1948); 
Estate of Goldberg, 203 Cal. App. 2d 402, 412, 21 Cal. Rptr. 626, 632 (1962). 
83. 83 Cal. App. 2d at 769-70, 189 P.2d at 743. 
84. Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 65-66, 332 P.2d 773, 777 (1958). 
85. See, e.g., Kunakoff, 166 Cal. App. at 67-68 (surviving putative spouse held to be 
an heir for the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 337 and therefore entitled to 
bring an action for wrongful death); Adduddell v. Board of Administration, 8 Cal. App. 
3d 243, 249, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1970) (surviving putative spouse held to be a surviv-
ing spouse for the purposes of Government Code section 21364 and therefore entitled to 
receive special death benefits under the Public Employees' Retirement Law); Brennfleck 
v. Workmen's Compo App. Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 672, 84 Cal. Rptr. 50, 53 (1979) 
(surviving putative spouse held to be a surviving widow for purposes of a former version 
of Labor Code section 4702 and was therefore entitled to receive workers' compensation 
death benefits). 
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the validity of the union. Also, the couple held themselves out to 
the community at large as legally married. They lived together 
for nearly nine years, and acted for all purposes as husband and 
wife. The court concluded that to deny the surviving putative 
spouse a share in his wife's separate property while allowing him 
to succeed to quasi-marital property made little sense and led to 
an unjust result. 
The court noted one court of appeal case on point where the 
court reached a contrary result.86 In Estate of Levie, the court 
awarded the putative spouse all of the quasi-marital property 
but denied her any share of the separate property. In the lower 
court, respondent herein relied upon the three reasons given by 
the Levie court in support of its holding. First, the court of ap-
peal found no California precedent suggesting that a putative 
spouse is entitled to succeed to an interest in the decedent's sep-
arate property. Second, it found that the equities which dictated 
that quasi-marital property be passed on to a surviving putative 
spouse did not exist with regard to separate property; in con-
trast to quasi-marital property, the combined efforts of the pu-
tative spouses did not contribute to the acquisition of separate 
property. Third, the court of appeal concluded that giving a sur-
viving putative spouse an interest in decedent's separate prop-
erty ignored the existing statutory scheme.87 
The California Supreme Court overruled Levie. It found the 
court of appeal's reasoning to be wrong and predicted that it 
would lead to absurd results. First, as noted herein, the supreme 
court cited numerous opinions in support of the proposition that 
a putative spouse is entitled to succeed to a share of a dece-
dent's separate property. Second, although it is true that the 
combined efforts of putative spouses do not contribute to the 
acquisition of separate property, the same is true for legally 
married couples. Third, according a surviving putative spouse a 
share in the decedent's separate property is consistent with the 
statutory scheme. The court reasoned that the rights of a surviv-
ing spouse to a decedent's separate property are statutorily cre-
ated. To acknowledge the same rights on behalf of a putative 
spouse merely recognizes that a good faith belief in the marriage 
86. Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 576·77, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1975). 
87. [d. at 577, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447. 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/4
1985] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 607 
should put the surviving putative spouse in the same position as 
a surviving legal spouse. 
C. Child Custody and Control 
1. Trial court must find that award of custody of a 
child to its natural father would be detrimental to 
the child before it may terminate natural father's 
custody rights. 
In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. 
Rptr. 309 (1984). In In re Baby Girl M., the California Supreme 
Court held that in a hearing conducted pursuant to Civil Code 
section 7017(d)88 to terminate a natural father's89 rights prior to 
Id. 
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 70I7{d) (West 1983) provides that: 
If, after the inquiry, the natural father is identified to the sat-
isfaction of the court, or if more than one man is identified as 
a possible father, each shall be given notice of the [adoption) 
proceeding .... If any of them fails to appear or, if appear-
ing, fails to claim custodial rights, his parental rights with ref-
erence to the child shall be terminated. If the natural father or 
a man representing himself to be the natural father claims 
custodial rights, the court shall proceed to determine parent-
age and custodial rights in whatever order the court deems 
proper. If the court finds that the man representing himself to 
be the natural father is a presumed father ... , then the court 
shall issue an order providing that the father's consent shall 
be required for an adoption of the child. In all other cases, the 
court shall issue an order providing that only the mother's 
consent shall be required for the adoption of the child. 
89. A natural father is a man who is found to be a child's biological father, but who 
has not met the conditions of California Civil Code section 7004 and is therefore not 
deemed the child's presumed father. This section provides that: 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he 
meets the conditions set forth. . . in any of the following sub-
divisions: (I) He and the child's natural mother are or have 
been married to each other and the child is born during the 
marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated 
by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or 
after a decree of separation is entered by a court. (2) Before 
the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have at-
tempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in ap-
parent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage 
is or could be declared invalid, and (i) If the attempted mar-
riage could be declared invalid only by a court, the child is 
born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after 
its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
or divorce; or (ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without 
a court order, the child is born within 300 days after the ter-
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the adoption of the child, a determination that award of custody 
of the child to its natural father would be detrimental to the 
child pursuant to Civil Code section 460090 must be made in or-
der to terminate the natural father's custody rights. 
The father and Baby Girl M.'s mother dated for a few 
months in 1980. Neither knew she was pregnant when the rela-
tionship ended. The child was born July 18, 1981, and was 
placed in a foster home three days later. The father never knew 
of the pregnancy. He was informed of the birth on August 1, 
1981. 
The father contacted the Department of Social Welfare, and 
on August 5 requested that his daughter be placed with the fam-
ily then providing day care for his sons. The same day, the 
mother formally relinquished the child for adoption, and re-
jected the father's placement request, stating that she did not 
want the child to be placed with any family that the natural par-
ents knew. 
A section 7017 petition to terminate the father's parental 
rights was filed August 10. The father at that point arranged to 
see the child, and on August 17, requested custody. However, 
Baby Girl M. was placed with the prospective adoptive parents 
on August 24. 
At the section 7017(d) hearing, the court found that the fa-
ther was Baby Girl M.'s biological father, and that he would be 
mination of cohabitation. (3) After the child's birth, he and 
the child's natural mother have married, or attempted to 
marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent com-
pliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could 
be declared invalid, and (i) With his consent, he is named as 
the child's father on the child's birth certificate, or (ii) He is 
obligated to support the child under a written voluntary 
promise or by court order. (4) He receives the child into his 
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983). 
[d. 
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West Supp. 1985) provides that: 
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a per-
son or persons other than a parent, without the consent of the 
parents, it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a 
parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a 
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child. 
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able to provide a loving home for the child. The ~ourt neverthe-
less found that it was in the best interests of the child that she 
remain with her adoptive parents. 
The California Supreme Court held that the appropriate 
standard to be used in determining the custodial rights of natu-
ral fathers in a section 7017(d) hearing is the "detriment stan-
dard" established in section 4600.91 The court based this conclu-
sion on its analysis of statutory and decisional authority, recent 
legislative history, and public policy. 
According to the court, section 4600 sets forth a mandate 
that custody of a child in a dissolution proceeding may not be 
awarded to non parents without the consent of both parents or a 
finding that it would be detrimental to the child to award cus-
tody to a parent. In In re B.G.,92 in an analysis of the legislative 
history of section 4600, the California Supreme Court held that 
that section applies to any proceeding in which the custody of a 
minor child is at issue. The court stated that since In re B. G. 
was decided prior to the enactment of section 7017, the legisla-
ture was aware that In re B.G. had extended the section 4600 
standard to proceedings outside the Family Law Act. Therefore, 
if it had intended that the section 4600 standard not apply in 
section 7017(d) hearings, it would have specifically said so. 
The court acknowledged that the legislature did pass As-
sembly Bill 649, which was vetoed by the governor because of 
financial provisions it contained. That bill had expressly de-
clared that the provisions of section 4600 would not apply to an 
alleged natural father seeking custody in a section 7017(d) hear-
ing.98 However, when it was reintroduced as Assembly Bill 
1782,94 the author agreed to delete that language from the bill. 
Thus, the court concluded, the legislature declined an opportu-
nity to disapprove of the application of the section 4600 stan-
dard to 7017 hearings. 
The court also determined that this decision was consistent 
91. Id. 
92. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 695, 523 P.2d 244, 255, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445 (1974). 
93. A.B. 649 § 6(h) (1983). 
94. A.B. 1782 (1983). 
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with public policy as expressed by the Uniform Parentage Act9~ 
and other relevant California Civil Code sections. California 
Civil Code section 19796 establishes that both mothers and pre-
sumed fathers must give consent before an adoption can pro-
ceed, unless their parental rights have been terminated under a 
section 23297 or section 22496 hearing. Each parent is equally en-
titled to the child's custody. If the father is a natural rather than 
a presumed father,99 the mother alone is entitled to custody. 
Only when the natural mother gives the child up for adoption 
are a natural father's rights considered. Pursuant to section 
7017(d), he must be notified, and his custodial rights must be 
determined before the child may be adopted. 
The legislature, through this scheme, differentiates between 
the veto powers given unwed mothers, presumed fathers and 
natural fathers. The court determined that application of the 
detriment standard in a 7017(d) hearing will not defeat this pol-
icy. The court disapproved of the language in W.E.J. v. Superior 
Court/oo in which the court of appeal rejected the detriment 
standard in such hearings on the ground that its use would be an 
automatic veto by the father over the adoption. The California 
Supreme Court stated that such a veto will never arise, since the 
court may always determine that it would be detrimental to the 
child for the father to gain custody. In such cases, the veto 
power will never be exercised; the natural father's consent to the 
adoption will not be required and the adoption will proceed. 
The California Supreme Court concluded that the state 
scheme under section 7017(d) satisfies the federal due process 
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
The United States Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the question of whether a natural father's parental 
rights require a finding of detriment rather than the less strin-
gent best interests standard. The California Supreme Court 
cited with approval a recent law review article in which the au-
95. CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). 
96. CAL. CIY. CODE § 197 (West 1982). 
97. CAL. CIY. CODE § 232 (West 1982). 
98. CAL. CIY. CODE § 224 (West 1982). 
99. See supra note 90. 
100. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 309-12, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866-68 (1979). 
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thor proposed that in regard to the constitutional rights of un-
wed fathers, a state "may not deny biological parents the oppor-
tunity to establish a protected custodial relationship."lol Unless 
a father voluntarily fails to pursy,e custody, or the child's stepfa-
ther voluntarily assumes custody, the natural father's attempt to 
gain custody must, in the absence of his unfitness, prevail over 
others seeking custody. Therefore, the court stated, the detri-
ment standard is met where the father chooses not to seek cus-
tody; the question never arises when there is a stepfather who 
assumes custody of the child. 
The court recognized that in the case before it, nearly three 
years had passed since the original 7017(d) hearing, during 
which Baby Girl M. had resided with her adoptive parents. 
Therefore, the court reasoned, the trial court might make a find-
ing of detriment to the child which, at the time of the original 
hearing, would have been unsupportable. The court directed the 
trial court on remand to consider these circumstances when 
making its determination. 
Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Kaus, issued a strong dis-
sent. He first noted serious omissions in the facts set out by the 
majority. For instance, the father on two occasions indicated to 
the Social Welfare Department that he did not desire custody. 
Further, the mother had agreed to an adoption only if the child 
were placed in a stable, two parent home. Justice Mosk con-
tended that the majority's holding will result in a situation in 
which many single mothers attempting to place their children in 
a stable, two parent home will refuse to relinquish custody 
rather than risk the chance of the child being placed with a man 
who became the child's father through a casual liaison. 
Justice Mosk also found a serious flaw in the legal reasoning 
of the majority opinion. He pointed out that the majority simply 
ignored the provision of section 7017(d) which provides that "if 
the court finds that the man is a presumed father, his consent to 
adopt is required; whereas if he is not a presumed father, only 
the mother's consent shall be required for the adoption of the 
child." 
101. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After 
Lehr u. Robertson (1984), 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984). 
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Justice Mosk also argued that the clear intention of the leg-
islature was to differentiate between the rights of presumed and 
natural fathers. He pointed out that the trial court must make a 
determination during the section 7017 proceeding whether a fa-
ther is presumed or natural; the question of whether the father's 
consent to adoption is necessary rests entirely on whether the 
father is one or the other. This legislative direction that the nat-
ural father's consent is not required is tantamount to saying that 
the court need not find detriment in order to free the child for 
adoption. Otherwise, there would be no difference between the 
presumed and natural father's custodial rights. 
Justice Mosk found additional support for his position in 
the legislative history of Senate Bill 347,102 which contains the 
Uniform Parentage Act. An analysis by the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee lOS clearly stated that the bill sought to abrogate any 
rights whatsoever unless the father is a presumed father. Other-
wise, the mother alone can consent to the child's adoption. 
While a natural father must be given notice of an adoption pro-
ceeding, and has the right to seek custody, there are absolutely 
no standards under which the court would be required to grant 
him custody. 
Further, Justice Mosk did not believe that the legislative 
history after the veto of Assembly Bill 649 indicated that the 
legislature did not intend to deprive natural fathers of the pa-
rental preference of section 4600; the legislature's intention was 
made clear when it enacted Assembly Bill 649.104 The fact that 
an author of a later bill chose to remove the provision is not 
indicative of legislative intent as a whole. 
Justice Mosk found the cases cited in support of the major-
ity's opinion inapplicable. He contended that the cases cited by 
the majority either involved vastly different factual situations, 
or were decided prior to the passage of the Uniform Parentage 
102. S.B. 347 § 7023(d), as amended May 20, 1975, required that a natural father be 
found unfit before the court could dispense with the requirement that he consent to 
adoption. The bill was later amended to provide that the only mother's consent is neces-
sary when the father is not classified "presumed." S.B. 347 § 7023(d), as amended Aug. 
12, 1975. 
103. Assembly Judiciary Committee of Senate Bill No. 347, 1975 Assem. File Analy-
sis, microfiche ed. 
104. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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Act. 
Finally, Justice Mosk addressed the factor of psychological 
harm to a child who has been with adoptive parents all his or 
her life. Justice Mosk argued that the majority did not give this 
emotional factor sufficient consideration, and that it should have 
instructed the trial court to give substantial weight to that 
element. 
The majority opinion in this case was written by Justice 
Sonenshine, on assignment to the California Supreme Court 
from the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In a court of appeal 
case, Michael U. v. Jamie B.,IOr> Judge Sonenshine wrote an 
opinion in which the court awarded custody of a newborn child 
to the sixteen-year-old natural father rather than to the prospec-
tive adoptive parents. The court of appeal did not find disposi-
tive the facts that the father was sixteen; the mother twelve; 
that the father smoked marijuana and had been dropped back at 
school; and that an expert witness testified that the child had 
developed a strong bond with the adoptive family and would 
suffer from the separation. Rather, the court stated that such 
considerations do not necessarily mean that the father, while im-
perfect, would be an unfit parent. l0e Neither was the question of 
age dispositive; just as a minor girl may be a parent, so may a 
minor boy. 
The court of appeal avoided the issue raised by the mother 
in In re Michael U. that the decision to give custody to the fa-
ther had been mistakenly based on the section 4600 standard.107 
The court of appeal allowed the decision to stand, first because 
the trial court had not made a statement of decision, and also 
because appellant "cannot complain if a higher standard than 
necessary was employed to determine whether the father should 
be granted custody of the child."IOB Misreading the provisions of 
the statute, the court determined that the detriment standard is 
used in awarding custody to nonparents, but is irrelevant when 
105. 160 Cal. App. 3d 193, 206 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1984), hg. granted Dec. 3, 1984 (L.A. 
32014). 
106. [d. at 201, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 328. 
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West Supp. 1985). For relevant statutory language, 
see supra note 90. 
108. 160 Cal. App. 3d 193, 199, 206 Cal. Rptr. 323, 327 (1984). 
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custody is awarded to the natural father himself. The court 
stated that the result in this case is not that the child was re-
moved from an environment in which he was doing well, but 
that he was removed from an environment in which he did not 
belong. The court of appeal concluded that preadoption place-
ment should not take place until a father's parental rights are 
terminated. 109 
The In re Michael U. decision awarded custody of a child to 
his natural father with no articulated reason and with no discus-
sion of the critical provision of section 7017 that only the 
mother's consent to adoption is necessary when the father is not 
deemed "presumed." The court disregarded as academic 
whether the section 4600 detriment standard is applicable when 
custody is awarded to a natural father. 
In re Baby Girl M. continued the faulty reasoning. As Jus-
tice Mosk clearly explained in his dissent, both the language of 
section 7017 and legislative history show that the legislature's 
intent was to deny natural fathers such preemptive rights. The 
legislature may now respond to the ruling of In re Baby Girl M. 
by passing a measure which will protect the decision of the 
mother in those situations where the father lacks the type of re-
lationship essential to be considered a "presumed father." 
2. Discontinuation of visitation is in best interest of 
child where child has been sexually molested by 
father. 
In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 
(2nd Dist. 1984). The court of appeal in In re Cheryl H. held 
that there was substantial admissible evidence to support the ju-
risdictional finding that Cheryl was a dependent of the court 
and the dispositional finding that the child's continued contact 
with her father was not in her best interest. The court held this 
despite ruling the psychiatrist's opinion testimony that the fa-
ther had sexually abused the child inadmissible hearsay. Finally, 
the court held that the trial court had properly applied the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard at both the jurisdictional 
and dispositional phases of the dependency hearing. 
109. Id. at 201, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 328. 
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A petition was filed by the Department of Social Services 
seeking to bring Cheryl H. within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court. The petition alleged that Mr. H. (Cheryl's father) sexually 
molested Cheryl and that Cheryl was suffering from three hy-
menal tears in her vagina in addition to other injuries. The lower 
court sustained the allegations in the petition. In the jurisdic-
tional phase of the ·dependency hearing, the trial court declared 
Cheryl H. a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 300(a) and (d).llo In the dispositional 
phase, the court allowed Cheryl to remain in her mother's home 
on the conditions that her father not be allowed to visit Cheryl 
and that he begin therapy. Cheryl's father appealed, contending 
that (1) the trial court erred by applying the preponderance of 
the evidence standard of proof; (2) the judgement was supported 
only on the basis of inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (3) the 
evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. 
The court appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Powell, had offered 
opinion testimony that Cheryl had been sexually abused. The 
court of appeal held this to be a proper subject for expert testi-
mony. Evidence Code section 801(a)1l1 allows an expert to tes-
tify in the form of an opinion if the opinion concerns a subject 
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an 
expert would assist the trier of fact. The court determined that 
Dr. Powell's education and training had prepared her to draw 
inferences and make a diagnosis from observing Cheryl's behav-
ior during play-therapy sessions. The trial court ruled that a lay 
person would have difficulty interpreting this data without Dr. 
Powell's assistance. This testimony was therefore ruled 
admissible. 
The court of appeal, however, ruled that the doctor's opin-
ion that Cheryl's father was the person who had sexually abused 
Cheryl went far beyond the proper scope of expert witness testi-
mony. Dr. Powell's opinion concerning the identity of the abuser 
was necessarily based on the assumption that merely by examin-
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) and (d) (West 1984). This statute allows the 
juvenile court to adjudge a minor to be a dependent child of the court if (a) the minor 
has no parent capable of exercising proper care or control over her or (d) if the home is 
unfit due to "neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse" of the child by a parent or 
guardian. [d. 
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § SOHa) (West 1966). 
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ing a patient, a doctor can make a valid diagnosis and draw valid 
conclusions as to the conduct of a third person, in this case 
Cheryl's father. The court of appeal reasoned that an expert is 
no better equipped than a lay person to make such inferences. 
The trier of fact is not assisted by hearing the expert's opinion 
and, accordingly, the court determined such testimony to be 
inadmissible. 
Furthermore, California does not currently have a statutory 
hearsay exception for out-of-court statements by victims of child 
abuse. ll2 Accordingly, Cheryl's out-of-court statement made dur-
ing play therapy was inadmissible hearsay. The Evidence 
Code1l3 allows opinion testimony concerning the credibility of 
hearsay declarants only when the hearsay statement has been 
independently admitted under a specific exception to the hear-
say rule. Since there was no specific hearsay exception applica-
ble, the court of appeal held that it was improper to admit Dr. 
Powell's opinion testimony concerning the credibility of Cheryl's 
hearsay statement. 
According to the court of appeal, most of the conduct and 
statements made by Cheryl about which Dr. Powell testified 
would have been independently admissible. The court character-
ized Cheryl's conduct during play therapy as nonassertive con-
duct not intended as a substitute for oral or written verbal ex-
pression under Evidence Code section 225114 and therefore not 
hearsay under Evidence Code section 1200.llII Cheryl's conduct 
112. The Washington Legislature has enacted a special hearsay exception for very 
young victims of child abuse which allows into evidence a statement made by a child 
under the age of ten describing any act of sexual abuse performed with or on the child. If 
the child is unavailable as a witness, the statement can still be admitted into evidence if 
there is corroborative evidence of the act. 1982 Wash. Legis. Servo ch. 129 § 2 (West). See 
also generally Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial 
Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 437 (1985). Here, the court of appeal was reluc-
tant to establish such an exception on its own and concluded that the task was better 
left to the California Legislature which could then establish appropriate safeguards to 
protect the rights of both the child victim and the accused adult abuser. 
113. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 780(e) and 1100 (West 1966). 
114. CAL. EVID. CODE § 225 (West 1966) which provides that "[sltatement means (a) 
oral or written verbal expression or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him 
as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression." Id. (emphasis added). Because 
Cheryl had no such intent, her conduct does not fall within the prohibition of the hear-
say rule. 
115. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966). This section provides that hearsay evi-
dence is "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying 
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during play therapy, which consisted of holding the female doll 
close to her while rejecting the male doll, orally copulating a 
male doll, putting a male doll on top of a female doll, and re-
coiling at the mention of her father, was determined by the 
court to be relevant to prove that Cheryl was molested, as well 
as supplying the basis for Dr. Powell's opinion to the same ef-
fect. Although Cheryl's out-of-court declarations that her father 
had molested her were inadmissible hearsay as to the truth of 
the statements, the court ruled that they constituted non-hear-
say evidence on the issue of Cheryl's state of mind and were rel-
evant in determining whether continued involvement by the fa-
ther with Cheryl was desirable. 
The court of appeal, relying on Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 355, held that at the jurisdictional phase of a de-
pendency hearing, the appropriate standard of proof is prepon-
derance of the evidence.116 However, the court ruled that neither 
this section nor section 300117 applied to the dispositional phase 
of the hearing. The court reasoned that the appropriate stan-
dard of proof for the dispositional phase depends on the particu-
lar disposition ordered by the court. Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 361(b)116 requires a clear and convincing quantum 
of proof only when a child is ordered removed from the custody 
of her or his parents. 
In this case, the juvenile court ordered that Cheryl remain 
with her mother. Therefore, the court of appeal found no com-
pelling reason to require application of a more stringent stan-
dard of proof. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence, accord-
ing to the court, served best to protect the interests of the child 
at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." [d. 
116. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West 1984) provides in pertinent part that 
"proof by a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must 
be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300." [d. 
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984). Subsection (d) of this section pro-
vides in pertinent part that: 
[d. 
[a]ny person under the age of 18 years who comes within ... 
the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the ju-
venile court which may adjudge such person to be a dependent 
child of the court: ... [w]hose home is an unfit place for him 
by reason of neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of 
either of his parents .... 
118. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1985). 
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and struck an acceptable balance between a safe home for the 
child, the interests of the parents in retaining their parental 
rights and the interests of the state to protect the child from 
parental abuses. The court of appeal concluded that in this case 
the trial court correctly determined that its decision to sever the 
father's parental rights until his rehabilitation was complete was 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 
3. Application of the term "convicted" as found in 
the Civil Code is limited to instances where there 
has been a final judgment. 
In re Sonia G., 158 Cal. App. 3d 18, 204 Cal. Rptr. 498 (5th 
Dist. 1984). The court of appeal in In re Sonia G. held that the 
trial court correctly limited the term "convicted" as used in Civil 
Code section 232(a)(4)119 to instances where there has been a fi-
nal judgment. The court of appeal therefore refused to sever the 
parental relationship based on this section of the statute. The 
court of appeal concluded, however, that the parental relation-
ship was properly severed under section 232 (a)(1)120 and 
(a)(2).121 
D. is the daughter of Diane R., and Stanley R. Sonia is the 
Daughter of Diane R. and her former husband. These minors 
[d. 
[d. 
119. See infra note 122. 
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(l) (West 1982) provides: 
[A)n action may be brought for the purpose of having any 
child under the age of 18 years declared free from the custody 
and control of either or both of his or her parents when the 
child comes within any of the following descriptions: (1) The 
child has been left without provision for the child's identifica-
tion by his or her parent or parents or by others or has been 
left by both of his or her parents or his or her sole parent in 
the care and custody of another for a period of six months or 
by one parent in the care and custody of the other parent for a 
period of one year without communication from the parent or 
parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to 
abandon the child. 
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985) provides that: 
[A child) who has been neglected or cruelly treated by either 
or both parents, if the child has been a dependent child of the 
juvenile court under any subdivision of Section 300 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code and the parent or parents have 
been deprived of the child's custody for one year prior to the 
filing of a petition pursuant to this section. 
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were taken into custody by the Kern County Welfare Depart-
ment (Department) after they reported that they had been sexu-
ally abused by Stanley. The Department sought a severance of 
the parental relationship on the basis of section 232(a)(4).122 The 
trial court refused to grant the severance since Stanley's convic-
tion for child abuse under Penal Code section 288a(c)128 was on 
appeal and therefore not final. 
The California Supreme Court has held that while an ap-
peal is pending, a lower court judgment of guilty is suspended. 
As long as there is a legal possibility of setting aside the lower 
court judgment, that judgment is not final. 124 
The court of appeal balanced the legislative policy in favor 
of a quick resolution of a child's future to provide stability and 
security of an adoptive home against the policy of viewing an 
involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship by the 
state as a drastic remedy to be applied only in extreme situa-
tions. The court of appeal held that the trial court correctly ap-
plied the clear and convincing standard to the proceeding to de-
termine whether to sever the parental relationship. A judgment 
which is not yet final because there is a possibility of its being 
overturned on appeal does not satisfy this clear and convincing 
test. Therefore, the parental relationship cannot be permanently 
severed under California Civil Code section 232(a)(4). 
The court of appeal determined, however, that the parental 
relationship could be severed under subsections (a)(l) and 
(a)(2). These subsections permit the severing of a parental rela-
tionship where it is determined that the children have been 
abandoned or neglected. The court recognized the risks of delay-
ing the final disposition of cases such as these until the appeal 
process has been completed. The court concluded, however, that 
in most cases in which a felony conviction for child abuse is be-
ing appealed, the facts will warrant the child being declared free 
122. This subsection provides that an action may be brought to free a minor child 
from the control and custody of his or her parent or parents if that "parent or parents 
are convicted of a felony, if the facts of the crime of which the parent or parents were 
convicted are of a nature as to prove the unfitness of the parent or parents to have the 
future custody and control of the child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 
1985). 
123. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(c) (West Supp. 1985). 
124. Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 869, 338 P.2d 182, 184-85 (1959). 
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from parental custody based on another subsection of section 
232. 
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A. Employment Discrimination 
1. Gender is not a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for a position as a cook in a men's jail. 
County of Alameda v. Fair Employment and Housing Com-
mission, 153 Cal. App. 3d 499, 200 Cal. Rptr. 381 (lst Dist. 
1984). In County of Alameda v. Fair Employment and Housing 
Commission the court of appeal applied the Fair Employment 
and Housing Actm to a case of race and sex discrimination and 
held that a black woman who had been denied employment had 
made a prima facie case of race discrimination. The court also 
held that the gender based practice of hiring only male cooks for 
employment in the men's jail facility was not justified as a bona 
fide occupational qualification. 
Plaintiff, a black woman, applied for a cook's position with 
the Alameda County Sheriff's Department. She had achieved the 
highest score on the written examination, had twenty years of 
cooking experience, and had placed first on the eligibility list.u6 
The white woman hired by the county was clearly less qualified; 
she had placed second on the eligibility list and had thirteen 
years less cooking experience. It was the first time in nine years 
that a job applicant with the highest test score was not hired by 
the Alameda County Sheriff's Department. The trial court de-
nied the county's petition to compel the Fair Employment and 
Housing Commission (Commission) to reverse its decision that 
the county had wrongfully denied employment to plaintiff. The 
county appealed. 
The court of appeal first examined the issue of racial dis-
crimination. It looked for guidance to cases decided under Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.I27 Although the wording of the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act and Title VII of the Federal 
125. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1985). 
126. Plaintiff testified that during her interview the county's food service manager 
told her that he would hire her over the other applicants, but that the final decision was 
not his. 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(c) (1982). 
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Civil Rights Act differ slightly, the anti discriminatory goals and 
public policy objectives behind both laws are similar.u8 It is an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire 
a person because of such person's color, race, sex, national ori-
gin, or religion. 129 For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination under either federal or state law she 
must show (1) that she belongs to a racial minority; (2) that she 
applied for and was qualified for the job; (3) that she was denied 
employment; and (4) that after the denial the position remained 
open and the employer continued to seek applicants with similar 
qualifications. The burden then shifts to the employer to articu-
late a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection. Fi-
nally, the unsuccessful applicant is given the opportunity to 
show that the employer's proffered reasons are merely a pretext 
to conceal its discriminatory intent.130 
The court in this case held that the plaintiff established a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination. The facts easily satis-
fied the requisite elements: the plaintiff was black and female; 
she applied with the county and was well qualified for the job as 
cook; she was not hired; and the county continued to interview 
prospective employees for the position. 
The county argued that the white woman's experience as a 
cook for high school students qualified her for the job as a cook 
for prison inmates. It also defended its choice to hire her on the 
ground that she appeared to be a minority since she had black 
facial characteristics. The court rejected the county's reasons for 
not hiring the plaintiff, and found that the facts of the case am-
ply supported the Commission's findings that the county's rea-
sons were a mere pretext for its discriminatory hiring practices. 
The court next examined the issue of sex discrimination. 
The county argued that it was justified in rejecting the plaintiff 
for a position in the men's jail faciliaty since Sheriff's Depart-
ment policy allowed only male cooks to work in the men's jail 
128. See Price v. Civil Service Commission, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 271, 276, 604 P.2d 1365, 
1373, 1376, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483·84, 487 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. 
App. 3d 311, 329·30, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981), citing with approval McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802·07 (1973). 
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (1982). 
130. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,.803·04 (1973). 
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facility. The county reasoned that gender is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification because the presence of a female cook would 
violate the inmate's right to privacy and would threaten 
security. 
A gender-based classification is permitted only if it is a 
bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the normal op-
eration of the place of employment. lSI In Dothard v. Rawlin-
son,lS2 a leading United States Supreme Court case on gender-
based classification, the Court held that in situations where a 
woman would have extensive physical or isolated contact with 
the inmates, she may properly be excluded from working as a 
prison guard. ISS In Long v. State Personnel Board,ls4 a Califor-
nia court of appeal upheld a lower court's denial of employment 
as a prison chaplain to a woman applicant. The Long court rea-
soned that the extensive isolated contact betwe~n the chaplain 
and the inmates might result in a sexual attack upon the female 
employee. ls6 
The court in Alameda noted that Dothard has been limited 
to the particular setting in which there is a very high risk of 
harm to female employees. lSG The Alameda court compared the 
factual setting in Dothard to the case at hand. The cook's posi-
tion in the men's facility did not require a threatening proximity 
to the inmates. In contrast, a guard works inside dormitories 
which house large groups of inmates. 
The court next rejected the county's argument that the 
male prisoner's privacy interests would be violated by the pres-
ence of a woman. The court followed Smith v. Fairman,137 a fed-
eral court of appeals case, which held that government agencies, 
except in extreme circumstances, must make suitable accommo-
dations where the privacy interests of the prison population con-
flict with the applicant's right to obtain a job. The court rea-
soned that female attorneys, psychologists, and others visited 
131. 42 u.S.C. § 2000e2(e) (1982). 
132. 433 u.S. 321 (1971). 
133. Id. at 336. 
134. 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974). 
135. Id. at 1016-18, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 573-75. 
136. S~ith v. Fai~man, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982). 
137. Id. at 55. 
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the jail without prisoners suffering any significant loss of pri-
vacy. Additionally, the court determined that the structure of 
the jail insured that the inmate's privacy would not be affected, 
and, in any event, if a woman cook's presence posed a threat to 
inmate privacy then structural modifications could easily be 
made. 
The court of appeal upheld a Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission's decision that a black woman had suffered race 
and sex discrimination by the County of Alameda. In doing so, 
the court made it clear that gender is a bona fide occupational 
qualification for employment in men's prisons only when the po-
sition would subject the woman to a high risk of harm. 
B. Unemployment Insurance 
1. Employee who accompanies "non-marital partner" 
voluntarily leaves work with good cause within the 
meaning of the statute governing eligibility for un-
employment insurance benefits. 
MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 
205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984). In MacGregor v. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., the California Supreme Court 
held that a worker who left her job to accompany her "non-mar-
ital partner" to another state in order to maintain the familial 
relationship they had established with their child, voluntarily 
left work with good cause within the meaning of the statute gov-
erning eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. l38 The 
court determined that the absence of a marital relationship is 
not a bar to the recovery of unemployment benefits when other 
compelling circumstances are established. The court stated that 
the preservation of the family unit is sufficient to establish the 
compelling circumstances necessary to constitute good cause 
under the statute. 
Plaintiff lived with her non-marital partner for two years 
during which they had one child. Due to his father's bad health, 
the plaintiff's non-marital partner decided to move the family to 
New York. Plaintiff quit her job to stay with her family. The 
California Development Department (Department) determined 
138. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1972). 
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that she had quit voluntarily without good cause and was there-
fore ineligible for benefits. This decision was upheld on appeal 
both by an administrative law judge in New York and by the 
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board). 
The superior court, pursuant to a writ of mandate sought by 
plaintiff, reversed and the Board appealed. 
Under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256,139 an 
individual is ineligible for unemployment compensation if he or 
she left work voluntarily without good cause. The California Su-
preme Court in Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.14° 
held that the claimant who left her place of employment in or-
der to preserve her relationship with a man she planned to 
marry did not establish good cause within the meaning of the 
statute. HI The Norman court, however, indicated that its deci-
sion did not necessarily preclude the possibility of finding suffi-
ciently compelling circumstances to constitute good cause in a 
non-marital relationship.l'2 The Norman court even foresaw the 
situation which arose in MacGregor and stated that where there 
were children present in a non-marital relationship, good cause 
might be shown. HS 
In this case, the California Supreme Court concluded that 
the existence of a legal marriage is not the exclusive means of 
showing good cause based on compelling family circumstances. 
The Board and the administrative law judge had rested their de-
cisions solely on the lack of a legally recognized marriage and 
dismissed even the possibility that any other relationship could 
establish good cause based upon compelling family circum-
stances. The supreme court, however, upheld the trial dourt's 
finding that the plaintiff had indeed established a family unit 
which consisted of herself, her partner and their child, and that 
the decision to move to New York was made to preserve the 
family unit. 
The supreme court also rejected the Board's policy argu-
ment for not recognizing good cause based on compelling family 
139. [d. 
140. 34 Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983). 
141. [d. at 9, 663 P.2d at 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139. 
142. [d. at 10, 663 P.2d at 910, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 140. 
143. [d. 
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circumstances in non-marital family couples. The Board main-
tained that its rule was consistent with the public policy of 
favoring marriage and of affording special benefits and protec-
tions to that institution. The supreme court pointed out that the 
policy of maintaining secure and stable relationships between 
parents and children is an equally strong policy consideration. 
This policy is codified in Civil Code section 7002144 and in the 
conciliation statutes relied upon by the Board,1411 in which the 
legislature explicitly recognized that the parent and child rela-
tionship extends equally to every child and to every parent, re-
gardless of the marital status of the parents. 
The aspect of the court's decision which is the most trouble-
some is the apparent narrowness of its application. The court's 
decision strikes a balance between countervailing policies, where 
the importance of the family unit rivals even that of the mar-
riage institution. There are other situations, however, such as 
gay and unwed couples without children, where compelling cir-
cumstances might warrant an award of unemployment compen-
sation when one partner leaves work in order to remain with the 
other. The enlightened and reality-based reasoning which guided 
the MacGregor decision has yet to be applied to such non-tradi-
tional families. 
C. Wrongful Discharge 
1. Woman wrongfully discharged for dating employee 
of her employer's competitor. 
Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. 
Rptr. 524 (1st Dist. 1984). In Rulon-Miller, the court of appeal 
upheld a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages on 
claims of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The court upheld the award of punitive damages 
on the grounds that statements made when the plaintiff was dis-
charged implied that she could not act or think for herself, and 
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West 1983) provides that "[tJhe parent and child rela-
tionship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of the marital status 
of the parents." [d. 
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1730 (West 1982) provides that "[tJhe purposes of this 
chapter are to protect the rights of children and to promote the public welfare by pre-
serving, promoting, and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony, and to 
provide means for the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic 
and family controversies." [d. 
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that the management was acting in her best interests. The court 
of appeal found that such statements tended to humiliate and 
degrade the plaintiff, and emphasized her powerlessness to as-
sert her rights as an employee, which the court determined to be 
one of the most debilitating kinds of oppression. 
The plaintiff had worked her way up from sales to manage-
ment at IBM. She had consistently received awards and the 
highest possible performance ratings for her work. One week 
before her discharge, she had received a $4,000 merit raise. 
The plaintiff was dating a man who had previously worked 
for IBM, but had left to work for a competitor. It was widely 
known at IBM that he and the plaintiff were dating. No one had 
raised the issue of the relqtionship when the plaintiff was pro-
moted to management. 
One week after receiving her merit raise, plaintiff was told 
that her relationship constituted a "conflict of interest" and that 
she had to end the relationship or lose her job. She was given a 
few days to a week to think it over. However, the next day she 
was told that the decision had been made for her. When the 
plaintiff objected, she was dismissed. 
The court of appeal upheld the plaintiff's claim of wrongful 
discharge on the ground that existing IBM policies guaranteed 
the plaintiff the right to privacy in her personal life. The court 
determined that company action contrary to those policies con-
stituted a violation of the plaintiff's employment contract rights. 
The court noted that the common law rule that an employ-
ment contract of indefinite duration is generally terminable at 
will by either party, as codified in Labor Code section 2922,146 
was modified by the California Supreme Court's recognition of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in 
such contracts.U7 In this case, the employee's right to be dealt 
with fairly was "at least the right of an employee to the benefit 
of the rules and regulations adopted for his or her protection." 
Those IBM rules specifically stated that an employee's private 
146. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985). 
147. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 6lO P.2d 1330, 1336-37, 
164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 (1980). 
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life was of no concern to the company unless it interfered with 
his or her job performance, the performance of others, or af-
fected the reputation of the company in a major way. The IBM 
rules also indicated that a charge of "conflict of interest" could 
be based only on moonlighting or solicitation of clients, not on 
romantic relationships. 
The court of appeal also rejected the defendant's contention 
that the jury had been inadequately instructed on the standard 
to be used in determining whether IBM had acted in good faith 
in disc~arging Rulon-Miller. The trial court gave the jury seven 
factors to take into consideration including: (1) whether the em-
ployee was discharged for legitimate business and employment 
reasons; (2) whether the employee was discharged on a pretext; 
(3) whether the employee was engaged in a sensitive or confiden-
tial management position; (4) whether the employee had a con-
flict of interest; (5) whether the employee's relationship endan-
gered the employer's legitimate business interests; (6) whether 
the employer infringed upon the employee's personal privacy; 
and (7) whether the employee was discriminated against because 
of the employee's sex. 
Finally, the court of appeal upheld the award of punitive 
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That the 
plaintiff's manager's conduct could be termed "extreme, outra-
geous, and atrocious" was confirmed by examination of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the employer's invasion of the plain-
tiff's privacy. The court found a decided element of deception, 
since the manager had pretended that the plaintiff's relationship 
was something new. In addition, the manager acted in flagrant 
disregard of company policy. The court found this conduct to be 
unfair, but not atrocious. What made the conduct subject to pu-
nitive damages was the manner in which the manager brought 
these elements together by his statement that he was making 
the decision for the plaintiff. The court called the implications 
of this statement "richly ambiguous," perhaps meaning that the 
manager believed that the plaintiff could not act or think for 
herself, or that the manager was acting in her best interest. 
The court determined that the combination of statements 
and conduct tended to humiliate and degrade the plaintiff. The 
court stated that denial of rights which were guaranteed under 
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company policies and granted to all other employees degraded 
her as a person. By denying the plaintiff the right to choose be-
tween work and her relationship, the manager intended to em-
phasize her powerlessness to assert her employment rights. The 
court called such powerlessness "one of the most debilitating 
kinds of human oppression." Such conduct on the part of the 
manager amply supported the punitive damages award. 
The language of the court in this case is potentially valuable 
to women plaintiffs who seek punitive damages in a wrongful 
discharge suit. The actions which the court describes as extreme 
and outrageous in this case-emphasizing the plaintiff's 
powerlessness and inability to make a decision-can often be 
ascribed to traditional attitudes of male management toward fe-
male employees. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Equal Protection 
1. A difference in rights accorded to mothers and 
nonpresumed fathers does not violate the equal 
protection clause of the California or United 
States Constitutions. 
People v. Carrillo, 162 Cal. App. 3d 585, 208 Cal. Rptr. 684 
(1st Dist. 1984). In People v. Carrillo, the court of appeal held 
that the difference in the rights granted to mothers and non-
presumed fathers by Civil Code section 197U8 does not infringe 
upon a father's right to equal protection of the laws under the 
California or United States Constitutions. Therefore, the court 
concluded, there is no constitutional reason for not prosecuting a 
father for child stealing under California Penal Code section 
278.U9 
Alexandra M. believed that appellant Victor Carrillo was 
148. CAL. CIV. ConE § 197 (West 1982) provides in pertinent part: "The mother of an 
unmarried child is entitled to its custody, services and earnings. The father of the child, 
if presumed to be the father under subdivision (a) of Section 7004, is equally entitled to 
the custody, services and earnings of the unmarried minor .... " Id. 
149. CAL. PENAL ConE § 278 (West Supp. 1985) provides that: "Every person, not 
having a right of custody, who maliciously takes, detains, conceals, or entices away, any 
minor child with intent to detain or conceal that child from 8 person, guardian, or public 
agency having the lawful charge of the child shall be punished .... " Id. 
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the father of her child and initiated an action to name him as 
the father. After informing Victor that she was pregnant and 
thought him to be the child's father, Alexandra did· not hear 
from him until the child was six months old, the day Victor took 
a court ordered blood test. The test showed a 99.94 likelihood 
that Victor was the father of the child. Around the time of the 
blood test, Victor and his wife Margaret took the child from her 
mother. Alexandra did not see her child until six months later. 
The trial court found that Victor was not a "presumed fa-
ther" under Civil Code section 7004m and therefore Victor had 
no right to custody under Civil Code section 197.1IH Conse-
quently the court of appeal held that Victor could be prosecuted 
for child stealing under Penal Code section 278.1112 Victor ap-
pealed contending that Penal Code section 278 as applied to him 
in this case was unconstitutional. 
California Civil Code section 197 provides that absent a 
court order, both the natural mother and the man presumed to 
be the natural father of a child pursuant to Civil Code section 
7004 are entitled to the custody, services and earnings of an un-
married minor. Penal Code section 278 makes it a crime for a 
person "not having the right of custody" of a child to take, en-
tice away, detain or conceal the child from his or her parent or a 
person with lawful custody.1II3 
The court of appeal noted that section 197 operates to deny 
a non presumed father custody rights in the child which are 
granted to the mother. Whether this deprivation violates the 
equal protection clause depends upon whether the mother and 
alleged natural father are similarly situated with respect to the 
child. 11I4 Those statutes which limit the rights of the natural fa-
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983). For relevant statutory language, see supra 
note 89. 
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1982). For relevant statutory language, see supra 
note 148. 
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West Supp. 1985). For relevant statutory language, see 
supra note 149. 
153. C{. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66 (1959), in 
which the California Supreme Court held that in the absence of a custody order, a par-
ent with the right of custody does not commit child stealing by taking exclusive posses-
sion of the child. 
154. Lehr v. Robinson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
(1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
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ther vis-a-vis those of the mother regardless of whether he had 
established significant custodial, personal or financial relation-
ships with the child, have been found unconstitutional, while 
statutes which made such a distinction have been upheld. m 
California cases considering Civil Code section 197 in the 
context of adoptionUI6 have generally held that the statutory 
scheme satisfies both California and federal constitutions since 
it allows an alleged natural father to attempt to establish the 
existence of a relationship pursuant to Civil Code section 70061117 
and an opportunity to qualify as a presumed father under sec-
tion 7004. Here, the court observed that the statutes at issue do 
not create irrebuttable presumptions or make it impossible for a 
non presumed natural father to obtain custody rights in his child. 
The court referred to recent court of appeal decisions16s which 
have held that a non presumed natural father is still entitled to 
the benefit of the parental preference doctrine unless counter-
vailing policy interests prevail. 
The court in Carrillo found sufficient countervailing policy 
reasons not to protect the natural father's interest. The father 
was not challenging the constitutionality of sections 197 of the 
155. Compare Lehr v. Robinson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246 (1978) with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
156. See, e.g., In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 132-35, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554, 558-
61 (1977); Adoption of Rebecca B., 68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 198, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 
(1977). 
Id. 
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West 1983) provides in pertinent part: 
An action to determine the existence of the father and child 
relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed fa-
ther under Section 7004 or whose presumed father is deceased 
may be brought by ... a man alleged or alleging himself to be 
the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the 
alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor. The 
commencement of such an action shall suspend any pending 
proceeding in connection with the adoption of such child, in-
cluding a proceeding pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 
7017, until a judgment in the action is final. 
158. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984) and 
Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984) have both held 
that due process and equal protection of the laws demand that a natural father's rights 
not be terminated nor custody of his child awarded to a non parent except upon a finding 
that award of custody to the natural father would be detrimental to the child. See supra 
text accompanying notes 89-109 for further discussion of the rights of nonpresumed nat-
ural fathers. 
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Civil Code and 278 of the Penal Code in order to obtain legal 
custody of his child. He was making his claim as a defense to a 
criminal conviction of child stealing. It was, therefore, solely in 
his own interest as opposed to that of his daughter's that he 
made his constitutional claim. Victor had never followed any of 
the procedures provided by statute to establish paternity or pro-
vide any assistance, financial or otherwise, to mother or child. 
The court of appeal concluded that due to the patently dif-
ferent nature of their respective relationships to their child, the 
natural mother and the non presumed natural father were not 
similarly situated. The mother provided and would continue to 
provide all the care for the child, while the father went so far as 
to deny paternity until the court ordered him to submit to a 
blood test. Due to appellant's failure to establish any paternal 
relationship with the child, the court of appeal held that the dif-
ference in rights accorded to mothers and nonpresumed fathers 
under the Civil Code did not violate Victor's constitutional 
rights as applied in this case. Therefore the court found no rea-
son that Victor should not have been prosecuted under Penal 
Code section 287. 
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